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I. Introduction
In developing countries, where the majority of the population depends on
agriculture, incomes often display a considerable amount of variation due to
ﬂuctuations in rainfall, disease, and pest pressure. As few insurance possibil-
ities exist, attitudes toward risk are crucial determinants of economic decisions
and in particular investment behavior.1
The extensive literature that tries to measure risk attitudes has sometimes
inferred them from economic decisions ðsee, e.g., Moscardi and De Janvry
1977; Antle 1987Þ. Other studies have attempted to directly elicit preferences
The data were gathered in India during 2007–8, in collaboration with the International Crop
Research Institute of the Semi-Arid Tropics. This research was funded through National Science
Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement grant 0649330, an Agricultural and Ap-
plied Economics Association McCorkle fellowship, a Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies
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Management Department and Chris Barrett. We acknowledge the research assistance of Sanjit
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1 While several studies have conﬁrmed the existence of informal insurance networks in village
economies ðsee, e.g., Townsend ½1994 for a study in the context of this articleÞ, full insurance has not
been conﬁrmed as of yet for households facing large nonidiosyncratic risk ðwhere risk correlates
within the insurance networkÞ. See also Mahul and Wright ð2003Þ for a discussion on the welfare
implications of crop insurance.
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over risky distributions ðsee, e.g., Dillon and Scandizzo 1978; Binswanger
2
240 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G E1980; Just and Lybbert 2009; Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009; Liu 2013Þ. Fol-
lowing in the line of this second strand of the literature, we conducted ex-
periments to measure the attitudes toward risk among cotton farmers in three
villages in India. These attitudes were elicited via farmers’ evaluations of hy-
pothetical ðbut realisticÞ production alternatives involving various risky out-
comes. Each alternative was presented as a probability distribution over cot-
ton yield outcomes. The farmers then indicated their willingness to pay for a
bag of cotton seeds that would result in such a distribution.
The results point to the surprising prevalence of risk seeking in the house-
holds in our sample. As many as 85% of the sampled farmers expressed a
willingness to pay more for riskier distributions. The willingness to accept risk
in return for the potential to achieve high payoffs bears a strong negative re-
lation to household wealth. Qualitative as well as statistical evidence suggests
that these apparently anomalous results might be rationalized by credit con-
straints in combination with nonconvexities in production associated with
large ﬁxed-cost investments.3 Irrigation and higher education in children
appear to be two prominent examples of such investments.
Our ﬁndings on risk attitudes are markedly different from the existing lit-
erature, which has by and large foundmoderate to large degrees of risk aversion.
For example, Binswanger ð1980Þ measures attitudes toward risk among the
same households studied in this article using two methods: an experimental
approach with real and hypothetical payoffs of various magnitudes and an inter-
view method. The results of the experimental method indicate that at medium-
sized payoff levels ðequivalent to the monthly salary of an unskilled laborerÞ,
virtually all individuals are moderately risk averse, with little variation accord-
ing to personal characteristics. More recently, Liu ð2013Þ, using a low-stakes
ðequivalent to the daily wage of a laborerÞ, real payoff experimental method,
ﬁnds evidence of both risk and loss aversion among Chinese cotton farmers,
in addition to overweighting of low probabilities. Akay et al. ð2011Þ, using
low-stakes experiments among Ethiopian farmers, ﬁnd that almost 80% of
the sample is risk averse. Yesuf and Bluffstone ð2009Þ conduct medium-stakes
experiments in Ethiopia, with real payoffs set in an agricultural context. They
2 The literature on risk in agriculture and risk in the context of developing countries is vast, and any
attempt to summarize it would necessarily be incomplete. For an overview, see ðamong othersÞ
Moschini and Hennessy ð2001Þ.
3 It is well known that farmers face credit constraints in developing countries. See Rosenzweig and
Wolpin ð1993Þ and Fafchamps and Pender ð1997Þ for studies set among the same households studied
in this article.
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ﬁnd that depending on the expected payoff and range, one-third to two-thirds
Maertens, Chari, and Just 241of households are severely risk averse. De Brauw and Eozenou ð2011Þ ask
farmers in Mozambique to choose between two hypothetical varieties of sweet
potato, a less risky and a more risky variety, and ﬁnd that the average farmer in
their sample is risk averse.
Webelieve the distinctiveness of our results is due to the high stakes involved:
for the average farmer in our sample, achieving the best outcome in the hy-
pothetical distribution would generate over Rs 16,000 in revenue on a per acre
basis, a very sizable amount that is comparable to the farmer’s annual income.
At such levels, it appears likely that the tendency to avert risk is overridden by
the possibility of moving to a new, permanently higher level of income by un-
dertaking a large investment that would normally be unaffordable. We also
think that our results, while different, are not necessarily incompatible with the
ﬁndings of prior studies. The logic that high-ﬁxed-cost investments with high
returns can justify risk loving in the face of high-payoff gambles would also
imply that if the payoffs are not large enough then these investments may be
out of the question, in which case we would ﬁnd ourselves back in the world of
risk aversion.
We are aware of three other studies that have found evidence of risk-loving
behavior among farmers. Ross, Santos, andCapon ð2012Þ use small-stakes, real
payoff experiments in Lao People’s Democratic Republic and ﬁnd that the
majority of the respondents act in a risk-loving manner, and about half of the
respondents are ambiguity averse. Just and Lybbert ð2009Þ conduct medium-
stakes experiments inTamilNadu ðIndiaÞwith real payoffs set in an agricultural
context similar to ours and ﬁnd that only 49% of farmers are risk averse in a
comparison of two lotteries, one of which is a mean-preserving spread of the
other. Dillon and Scandizzo ð1978Þ report that a small but signiﬁcant fraction
of farmers in their study ðset in BrazilÞ could be classiﬁed as risk loving on the
basis of their measure. Although the difference in context, time period, and
methodology makes comparisons with our study difﬁcult, these ﬁndings sug-
gest that wemay need tomove away from our traditional view of the risk-averse
farmer.
The idea that nonconvexities can induce risk taking, while intuitive, has
so far largely remained a theoretical possibility ðsee, e.g., Lybbert and Barrett
2011; Lybbert et al., forthcomingÞ. We believe ours to be the ﬁrst empirical
exploration of this idea. More generally, this article answers the call of Just and
Pope ð2003Þ, who argue that many alternative explanations can be offered for
observed behavior under risk, only one of which is curvature of the utility
function. The observed risk response might also be due to technology, physicalThis content downloaded from 139.184.30.133 on Tue, 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 AM
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constraints, or ﬁnancial asymmetries. In order to properly infer or measure risk
242 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eaversion from observed choices, one needs to carefully isolate the impacts of all
these factors.
The article proceeds as follows. Section II describes the study site and the
experiment, Section III analyzes the results of the risk experiment, Section IV
presents an illustrative model, and Section V concludes.
II. Description of the Study Site and Experiment
A. Study Site
Table 1 introduces the three villages selected for this study. These villages have
been followed for over 35 years by the Village Level Studies ðVLSÞ pro-
gram of the International Crop Research Institute of the Semi-Arid Tropics
ðICRISATÞ.4
Aurepalle, with 925 households, is the largest of the three villages. It is
located in the drought-prone, poor Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh and,
in terms of average income, is situated between the richer Kanzara and the
poorer Kinkhed. Kanzara and Kinkhed, with 319 and 189 households, respec-
tively, are located in the less drought-prone Akola district of West Maharash-
tra. The VLS sample includes 128, 63, and 55 households in Aurepalle, Kan-
zara, and Kinkhed, respectively. In both Akola villages, households own, on
average, 5–6 acres of land. In Aurepalle, this is signiﬁcantly less, at about
3.4 acres. The average size of a household is four to ﬁve members in all three
villages.
The average education level of the respondent ði.e., the main decision
maker with regard to agricultureÞ is low, especially in Aurepalle ð2.3 yearsÞ. It
is important to note that in these villages, enrollment in school is very high
ð93% of the children between 6 and 15 years old are in schoolÞ, but the rate
drops sharply at the higher-education level ð21% of the young adults be-
tween 19 and 21 years old are enrolled in an education instituteÞ. This might
be partially due to credit constraints. Higher education can be expensive in
India, ranging from Rs 1,000 to Rs 100,000 for a degree, yet very few of the
farmers in Aurepalle and Kinkhed report having access to bank credit. In Kan-
zara 18% have access to bank credit.5
In all three villages, agriculture is one of the main sources of income, and
cotton is the main cash crop. Over 80% of the households in Kanzara and
4 For an overview of the goals, method, and outcomes of the VLS, see Singh, Binswanger, and Jodha
ð1985Þ, Walker and Ryan ð1990Þ, Bantilan et al. ð2006Þ, and Rao and Charyulu ð2007Þ.
5 While credit is available from other sources, such as input dealers, moneylenders, and informal
networks ðsee Besley ½1995 for an introductionÞ, the respondents reported that in terms of large
amounts of credit for productive purposes only the banks ðand in some cases the company selling the
equipmentÞ are an option.
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Kinkhed farm cotton. In Aurepalle, due to the relatively large number of
6
TABLE 1
BASIC DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF AUREPALLE, KANZARA, AND KINKHED
Aurepalle Kanzara Kinkhed
Number of households in village 925 319 189
Number of households in sample 128 63 55
Number of households in the experiment 95 57 54
Median rainfall, 2001–7 ðmm/yearÞ 434 748 745
Distance to nearest town ðkmÞ 10 9 12
Average land owned ðacreÞ* 3.4 5.2 6
Average dryland owned ðacreÞ* 2.4 2.1 2.6
Average irrigated land owned ðacreÞ* 1 3 3
Average number of household members 4.23 4.87 4.50
Average annual income ðRsÞy 43,543 53,720 38,087
Average education level of respondent ðin yearsÞ 2.31 6.61 6.89
Average maximum level of education in household ðyearsÞ 7.08 10.41 10
% of children enrolled in school, 2001–8 91 100 95
% of young adults enrolled in an educational institute, 2001–8 32 32 27
% of households that farm cotton, 2001–8 60 84 82
Average cotton yield, 2007–8 ðQ/acreÞ 8.97 3.50 1.88
Average cotton yield, 2001–4 ðQ/acreÞz 3.53 5.76 4.90
Average cotton yield, 2005–7 ðQ/acreÞz 4.46 2.47 3.21
Income from agriculture ð% of kharif incomeÞ§ 55 70 66
Average seed price non-Bt cotton ðRs/acreÞk 650 411 625
Average seed price Bt cotton ðRs/acreÞk 1,280 929 1,196
% of respondents who have access to irrigation 42 30 27
% of respondents with access to bank credit# 1.12 17.54 0
Note. Average/percentage/median statistics refer to the sample in each village in 2007–8 unless other-
wise noted. Children are deﬁned as being between age 6 and 15, and young adults are deﬁned as being
between age 15 and 25. Q 5 quintal; Bt 5 Bacillus thuringiensis.
* Includes the landless households.
y 2004–5 household-level income as reported in the ICRISAT-VLS.
z Calculated using the ICRISAT-VLS input-output data.
§ Based on the income earned from all agriculture-related activities at the time of interview during the
kharif season ðrainy season, the main agricultural seasonÞ; this might be an underestimate as not all of the
harvest was sold at that point in time.
k The average of what respondents—on average—expect a bag sufﬁcient for 1 acre of seed to cost ðnote
that the expected seed cost varies a lot by cultivarÞ.
# Respondent was asked who he would approach for credit to buy agricultural inputs and how likely he
would be to receive credit from this individual/organization. Multiple answers were possible. Percentage
here corresponds to the respondents who said that they have access to government or private bank credit.
Maertens, Chari, and Just 243landless families, this number is lower at 60%. The average cotton yield var-
ies strongly from year to year. In 2007–8, it was around 9 Q/acre in Aure-
palle, 3.5 Q/acre in Kanzara, and 2 Q/acre in Kinkhed.7
Losses in cotton production in this region are due ðamong other thingsÞ to
its predominant cultivation under rain-fed conditions: both droughts and,
more recently, ﬂoods are an issue. The average cotton yield in Kanzara and
6 Based on ICRISAT data for the last 7 years.
7 1 quintal ðQ Þ 5 100 kilograms.
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Kinkhed during the last few years was lower in comparison to 2001–4, a
244 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eresult the farmers attribute to excess rainfall and ﬂooding. In 2007–8, 42%,
30%, and 27% of the respondents in Aurepalle, Kanzara, and Kinkhed, re-
spectively, reported having access to irrigation at some point during the year.
Irrigation not only reduces rainfall-related risks during the rainy season but
also allows for cultivation during the dry season.8 Both surface water ðrivers, ca-
nals, ponds, and basinsÞ and groundwater ðwellsÞ are used as irrigation sources.
The water is applied on the ﬁeld through ﬂood irrigation, drip irrigation, or
sprinkler irrigation. We have no information on the installation of drainage
systems but have data on whether the farmer perceives waterlogging to be a
ðgeneralÞ problem on his plots: less than 1% of the plots are considered to have
problems.
The cost of a well, irrigation, or drainage system is substantial, amounting
to several times the average annual income. The cost of a well varies, depend-
ing on the depth of the water table. When the water table is more than
8 meters below the ground, a submersible pump must be used to lift the water,
whereas a centrifugal pump is sufﬁcient if the water table is less than 8 meters
below ground level ðGibson and Singer 1969Þ. The cost of a deep well is more
than four times the cost of a shallow well ðSekhri 2011Þ. In addition, there is
an element of risk, owing to the fact that the depth of the groundwater table in
a particular area is usually not known in advance.
B. Description of the Experiment
The farmers’ risk attitudes were assessed by presenting them with a set of hy-
pothetical yield distributions. Differently from prior experimental studies of
risk preferences, we explicitly framed our lotteries in terms of yield from an
agricultural crop ðcottonÞ. This served to add realism to the experiment, which
partly compensated for the hypothetical nature of the payoffs. Providing a fa-
miliar context made it easy for the farmers to understand the gambles and what
they represented.
The experiments were conducted among all ICRISAT-VLS respondents
who had farmed in the past 7 years or who were thinking of farming in the
future ð206 of the 246 ICRISAT-VLS respondentsÞ. Henceforth, we refer to
this set of respondents as the “farmers.” Details on the experimental setup are
included in appendix A.
8 Considering the beneﬁts of irrigation in the rainy season, the average proﬁt for an irrigated cotton
plot is Rs 6,030/acre ðSD: Rs 8,298/acreÞ versus Rs 4,051/acre ðSD: Rs 5,348/acreÞ for an unirri-
gated plot.
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The risk experiment, based on Lybbert and Just ð2007Þ and Just and Lybbert
Maertens, Chari, and Just 245ð2009Þ, consisted of four hypothetical farming seasons. For each “season” the
farmer was asked through a verbal exercise his willingness to pay ðWTPÞ for a
bag of cotton seed with a particular yield distribution ðsufﬁcient to sow 1 acre
of cottonÞ. To deal with illiteracy and innumeracy, we used a visual method
based on Lybbert and Just ð2007Þ: Fisher-Price building blocks were vertically
stacked, to present the various cotton yield distributions ðin quintals ½Q  per
acreÞ. We used a total of 20 blocks, each block representing 5%, and three
different colors. Green represents the high yield ði.e., 8 Q/acreÞ. Yellow rep-
resents the average yield ði.e., 6 Q/acreÞ, and red represents the low yield ði.e.,
4 Q/acreÞ. The average output price is about Rs 2,100/Q, so these numbers
correspond to Rs 8,400, Rs 12,600, and Rs 16,800 in revenues. We opted for
yield distribution, as opposed to revenue or proﬁt distribution, as this setup
aligned closely with how the farmers themselves thought about risk.
We aimed to design the experiment such that the average yields one could
obtain were comparable to what farmers are actually obtaining in the ﬁeld.
However, as the average yield on the ﬁeld varied a lot from year to year, this
was not an easy task. We tried out various speciﬁcations during the trial round,
ﬁrst basing our yields on the average obtained in 2001–7 ðwhich is about 4 Q/
acre, so the yields offered were 2 Q/acre, 4 Q/acre, and 6 Q/acreÞ, but ac-
cording to the farmers’ own account this was much too low for them to even
consider buying these seeds. They explained to us that with the new geneti-
cally modiﬁed seeds on the market, the average yields were on the increase.
Hence, we decided to redesign the experiment and base our yields on their
current reference point; that is, the average yield in 2007–8 was 5.5 Q/acres.
Comparing these outcomes with the average yield levels in three villages, one
can see that for the Aurepalle farmers, this distribution is at the lower end of
what they are currently achieving, while for the Akola farmers it is at the
higher end, especially for Kinkhed ðmainly due to the excess rainfall in the last
few years in AkolaÞ.
We started with two trial distributions to help the farmers learn the game
and then did four experiments, in the order reﬂected in table 2. We did not
randomize the order of the distributions, and we recognize that order effects
might be a concern. Holt and Laury ð2005Þ ﬁnd systematic scaling up of risk
aversion by ordering larger payoffs after lower payoffs lotteries, and they as-
cribe this to learning effects ðsee also Harrison et al. ½2005 for a discussionÞ.
However, Alpizar, Carlsson, and Naranjo ð2010Þ ﬁnd no signiﬁcant order ef-
fects in real risk experiments framed in an agricultural manner among coffee
farmers in Costa Rica. We take up this issue in greater detail in Section III.This content downloaded from 139.184.30.133 on Tue, 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The two trial distributions and the four actual lotteries are presented in
TABLE 2
HYPOTHETICAL YIELD DISTRIBUTIONS
Trial Distribution Actual Distribution
T1 T2 L1 L2 L3 L4
4 Q/acre 100 50 25 30 30 10
6 Q/acre 0 50 50 40 30 55
8 Q/acre 0 0 25 30 40 35
Expected value 4 5 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.5
Variance 0 1 2.0 2.4 2.8 1.6
Note. 1 quintal ðQÞ 5 100 kg. Data represent probabilities multiplied by 100.
246 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Etable 2. Of the latter, the ﬁrst baseline distribution has an expected yield of
6 Q/acre and a variance of 2 Q/acre. The second distribution has the same
expected yield but a higher variance than the ﬁrst distribution, namely, 2.4 Q/
acre. Thus, the ﬁrst distribution second-order stochastically dominates
ðSOSDÞ the second distribution. The third distribution has a higher expected
yield than the ﬁrst one but also a considerably higher variance, 6.2 Q/acre and
2.76Q/acre, respectively. The fourth distribution ﬁrst-order stochastically dom-
inates ðFOSDÞ the ﬁrst distribution, with an expected yield of 6.5 Q/acre
and a variance of 1.55 Q/acre, and FOSD a distribution that SOSD the third
distribution. Note also that both the fourth and the third distribution FOSD
the second distribution.
The effect of using hypothetical payments as opposed to real payments has
not yet been settled in the literature. The validity depends on the nature of the
experiment and elicitation method. In this case, one may argue that “the
subjects have no special reason to disguise their true preferences” ðKahneman
and Tversky 1979, 265Þ as their decision has no ﬁnancial consequences. Bin-
swanger ð1980Þ, who conducted monetary experiments among the same
households as we did, found that the distribution of risk aversion in hypo-
thetical games was more dispersed than the distribution of risk aversion in real
games but that once the real game was played there was no difference between
the hypothetical and the real choices. In addition, he found that respondents
are signiﬁcantly more risk averse in a hypothetical high-stakes game ðRs 500Þ
compared to a real medium-stakes game, indicating that hypothetical payoffs
do not necessarily induce risk seeking. Kachelmeier and Shehata ð1992Þ, who
conducted laboratory experiments among Chinese students, detected no re-
sponse differences between no monetary payments and low monetary pay-
ments or between low and high nominal values in the absence of actual mon-
etary payments. In their survey of the literature, Beattie and Loomes ð1997ÞThis content downloaded from 139.184.30.133 on Tue, 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 AM
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conclude that “the absence ðor presenceÞ of ﬁnancial incentives is not a crucial
Maertens, Chari, and Just 247factor in encouraging ðor discouragingÞ violations of standard axioms in pairwise
ðriskyÞ choice problems” ð165Þ. Holt and Laury ð2002Þ, however, who con-
ducted experiments with students at three US universities, ﬁnd that respon-
dents are more risk loving when confronting hypothetical high-stakes ðover
US dollar;100Þ experiments versus real high-stakes experiments. They conclude
that “subjects facing hypothetical choices cannot imagine how they would ac-
tually behave under high-incentive conditions” ð1654Þ.
A key point to be noted is that all of the above-mentioned experiments tried
to provide a context-free environment, in order to ensure that the results could
not be attributed to framing. In contrast, our experiment was explicitly framed
as a seed-buying experience, and as a result we believe that our respondents
had less trouble imagining how they would react. In addition, our experience
was that the respondents understood the setup well. The setup was ﬁrst tried
out among nonsample respondents and perfected using their feedback.9
During the actual data collection, respondents were not asked to explain their
choices but requested to indicate if they could not understand the question
well.10 Only a few respondents appeared confused, and all replied with rea-
sonable estimates within the range of the actual seed prices ðsee the discussion
of table 3 in Sec. III.AÞ. The fact that this experiment was preceded by one in
which we elicited the respondent’s beliefs about the yield of various cotton
cultivars using the same tools might have also contributed to their under-
standing.
III. Analyzing Preferences
A. Risk-Loving Behavior
We refer to the lotteries in table 2 as T1 and T2 ðthe two trial distributionsÞ
and L1, L2, L3, and L4 ðthe actual distributionsÞ. Table 3 presents the de-
scriptive statistics on the willingness to pay ðWTPÞ for the actual lotteries.
9 We conducted both a qualitative round and a pilot ðtrialÞ round among 40 nonsample farmers in
person before the actual data were collected. The qualitative round provided general information on
the perception of risk and uncertainty, while the pilot round provided us with the opportunity to
adjust the setup of the experiment. The respondents in the trial round were asked to give feedback on
the setup of the experiment and the choices they made. The fact that we were working in the
ICRISAT villages helped, as the respondents were used to being interviewed and offered many
valuable suggestions.
10 The enumerators had a checklist to ensure the respondent understood the question ðwhen elicit-
ing the beliefs, e.g., the enumerator held up one block and asked how much that block represented—
5 %—etc.Þ. Blank looks, inconsistent answers, and oddly shaped distributions indicated to us that
the setup with the blocks was not yet understood, and we had to repeat the explanation.
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The median WTP ranges from Rs 580 for the ﬁrst lottery to Rs 750 for the
11
TABLE 3
WILLINGNESS TO PAY ðRsÞ
Mean SD Median
Distribution 1 ðL1Þ 705 380 580
Distribution 2 ðL2Þ 790 469 600
Distribution 3 ðL3Þ 926 553 700
Distribution 4 ðL4Þ 930 516 750
Note. Mean ðSD, medianÞ willingness to pay ðWTPÞ for the ﬁrst trial
distribution ðnot shown hereÞ was 395 ð234, 300Þ; mean ðSD, medianÞ
WTP for the second trial distribution was 551 ð304, 450Þ.
248 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Efourth lottery. ðWe should also note that all but one farmer preferred all the
actual lotteries to T1, while 94% of the farmers preferred all the actual lotteries
to T2—this is due to the fact that the trial experiments were unambiguously
dominated by the real experiments.Þ
We begin with a number of checks of internal consistency of preferences
that follow from ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance and transitivity ðsee also
table 4Þ: ð1Þ 85% ðstrictlyÞ prefer L4 to L2, 87% ðstrictlyÞ prefer L4 to L1, and
99% ðstrictlyÞ prefer L3 to L2. ð2Þ Then, anyone who ðstrictlyÞ prefers L3 to L4
must also ðstrictlyÞ prefer L3 to L1: this turns out to be true 94% of the time.
ð3Þ Further, anyone who ðstrictlyÞ prefers L3 to L4 and also ðstrictlyÞ prefers L1
to L2 must then also ðstrictlyÞ prefer L3 to L2: this turns out be true 100% of
the time. ð4Þ Anyone who ðstrictlyÞ prefers L4 to L3 must also ðstrictlyÞ prefer
L4 to L2: this happens 100% of the time. ð5Þ Anyone who ðstrictlyÞ prefers
L2 to L1 must also ðstrictlyÞ prefer L3 to L1: this is true 99% of the time. So
preferences look, by and large, internally consistent.
We now test the implications of risk aversion. Our ﬁrst measure of risk
lovingness is based on a comparison of the individual’s WTP for lotteries L1
and L2, with L2 representing a mean-preserving spread of L1. This permits a
sharp categorization of individuals: a risk-neutral person would be exactly
indifferent between the gambles, while a risk-loving person would strictly
prefer L1 to L2. One could categorize risk neutrality as being either weak risk
aversion or weak risk loving. We adopt the former convention, treating risk
neutrality as weak risk aversion ði.e., not evidence of risk lovingÞ so as to focus
our attention on strict risk seeking. Our second measure of risk lovingness is
based on a comparison of the individual’s WTP for L3 and L4. The second
measure of risk lovingness does not allow as sharp a categorization as the ﬁrst
measure because L3 has lower expected value as well as higher risk than L4.
11 Note that these are in the range of the actual seed prices ranging from about Rs 400 to Rs 1,300 in
table 1.
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In this comparison, any risk-neutral person would strictly prefer L4 over L3,
TABLE 4
DO FARMERS OBEY FOSD AND SOSD?
Prediction Should Be True Validity in the Data*
L4 > L2 For everyone ðby FOSDÞ 85% ðwith 10% indifferentÞ
L4 > L1 For everyone ðby FOSDÞ 87% ðwith 9% indifferentÞ
L3 > L2 For everyone ðby FOSDÞ 99% ðwith 1% indifferentÞ
L4 > L3 For risk-averse individuals ðby SOSD and then FOSDÞ 52% ðwith 9% indifferentÞ
L1 > L2 For risk-averse individuals ðSOSDÞ 11% ðwith 5% indifferentÞ
L3 > L1 Ambiguous 95% ðwith 3% indifferentÞ
Note. FOSD 5 ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance; SOSD 5 second-order stochastic dominance.
* Percentage of individuals for whom the prediction was true. Percentage of the farmers who attached
equal value to both prediction lotteries is shown in parentheses.
Maertens, Chari, and Just 249and the same might be true for some moderately risk-loving individuals. We
therefore treat a tie in this case as corresponding to risk lovingness.
Table 4 shows the percentage of sampled individuals whose stated pref-
rences are in line with these predictions. Remarkably, only 11% of the re-
spondents appear to be strictly risk averse when choosing between lotteries L1
and L2 ðand 5% of the respondents are willing to pay the same amountÞ. In
the intermediate comparison involving L3 and L4, nearly 48% of respondents
violate the predictions of risk aversion ðwith 9% of the respondents being
indifferent between the two lotteriesÞ.
The measure of risk lovingness based on the comparison between L3 and L4
is particularly useful because one may suspect that there may have been an
order effect in terms of comparing L1 and L2 that led to respondents believing
that the distributions were getting better ðfollowing the two trial experi-
mentsÞ. However, when comparing L3 to L4, the order effect would have to be
reversed in order for someone to appear risk loving. In particular, L4 looks
extremely attractive relative to L3 ðat least to a risk-averse individualÞ, yet
nearly 48% of the respondents proved to be risk loving in this comparison,
preferring L3 over L4. Appendix table C1 shows the results from regressing
WTP on the order of the lottery, controlling for individual ﬁxed effects. On
average, the WTP increases signiﬁcantly going from L1 to L3 but does not
change signiﬁcantly going from L3 to L4, reﬂecting the fact that a number of
individuals prefer L3 to L4. To the extent that there is an order effect in op-
eration whereby subjects prefer later lotteries to earlier ones, the comparison
of L3 and L4 may actually be underestimating the extent of risk lovingness.
To gain a better understanding of what drives WTP, we regress WTPon the
probabilities of the distributions, education level, wealth, and output prices
and input costs. The intuition behind this is as follows: if the farmer obeys
expected utility and displays risk aversion, then the magnitude of the effect ofThis content downloaded from 139.184.30.133 on Tue, 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 AM
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increasing the probability of the best outcome ðwhile reducing the probability
250 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eof the middle outcomeÞ should be smaller compared to the effect of increas-
ing the probability of the worst outcome ðwhile reducing the probability of
the middle outcomeÞ.
Expressed mathematically, deﬁne xi as the outcome, ui as the correspond-
ing utility level, and pi as the probability of achieving outcome i. If u 0ðÞ > 0,
u 00ðÞ < 0, 0 < x2 2 x1 5 x3 2 x2,12 then
yWTP
yp1
5
u1 2 u2
u 01 p1 1 u 02 p2 1 u 03 p3
; ð1Þ
yWTP
yp3
5
u3 2 u2
u 01 p1 1 u 02 p2 1 u 03 p3
; ð2Þ
ju3 2 u2j < ju1 2 u2 j ⇒
 yWTPyp3
 <
 yWTPyp1
; ð3Þ
with WTP deﬁned as
uðw1 outsideÞ5 o pi uðw2WTP1 xiÞ; ð4Þ
where w 5 initial wealth and outside 5 outside option ði.e., sowing noncotton
cropsÞ.
Table 5 presents the results of this analysis. We approximate the WTP
function by a linear model.13 Model 1 includes the respondent’s education
level, village-level ﬁxed effects, and wealth. Model 2 additionally includes the
2007–8 cotton yield as a regressor, as this may inﬂuence the results by setting a
reference point in the farmer’s mind. Note that the number of observations
used to estimate the model is substantially less than in model 1, as it includes
only the respondents who farmed cotton in 2007–8, as opposed to all farmers.
Model 3 includes farmer-level ﬁxed effects.14
12 Note that in our case x1 5 oQ 1 2 c, x2 5 oQ 2 2 c, and x3 5 oQ 3 2 c, with Q 1 5 4, Q 2 5 6,
Q 3 5 8, o 5 output price, and c 5 input cost.
13 Note also that even when one uses a simple expected utility model to explain the variation in the
WTP, the WTP will depend in a nonlinear manner on the characteristics of the distribution of the
outside option and the distribution of the gamble presented to the respondent, the output price and
input cost, and the respondent’s preferences with regard to risk.
14 Recall that each respondent expresses his WTP for four lotteries.
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While the distributions represent yield rather than proﬁts, it is possible
TABLE 5
CORRELATES OF WILLINGNESS TO PAY
OLS Fixed Effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Probability of obtaining 4 Q/acre 2367.340*** 2319.634*** 2319.634***
ð57.326Þ ð39.572Þ ð49.711Þ
Probability of obtaining 8 Q/acre 1,564.197*** 1,527.106*** 1,527.106***
ð102.163Þ ð106.803Þ ð72.890Þ
Education level of decision maker ðyearsÞ 4.972 7.473
ð5.462Þ ð5.963Þ
Wealth ðlandÞ per capita ð1,000 RsÞ .118 .133
ð.096Þ ð.102Þ
Wealth ðother assetsÞ per capita ð1,000 RsÞ 2.303 2.231
ð.451Þ ð.583Þ
Aurepalle fixed effect 287.026 12.899
ð62.764Þ ð109.600Þ
Kinkhed fixed effect 694.595*** 755.298***
ð76.097Þ ð97.329Þ
Output produced in 2007–8 ðQ/acreÞ 26.083
ð12.546Þ
Constant 242.147*** 202.641** 445.863***
ð68.535Þ ð92.025Þ ð27.482Þ
Note. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Dependent variable in the
ordinary least squares ðOLSÞ regressions is the willingness to pay for a lottery. Fixed effects refer to the
inclusion of individual-level ﬁxed effects. The value of other assets was computed using the 2006–7
ICRISAT data; other assets include livestock, savings, borrowings and lendings, machinery, equipment,
other durable goods, and stocks. Q 5 quintal.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
Maertens, Chari, and Just 251that respondents were factoring input and output prices in their calculations.
These prices are known only for farmers who farmed cotton in 2007–8. For
these farmers, we regress the output price and input costs of 2007–8 on a
series of household and individual-level variables. Table C2 reports the results.
The average output price is about Rs 2,100/Q, while the average cost of
inputs, other than seeds ðnot including the costs of the quasi-ﬁxed invest-
ments such as land and irrigation but including the value of family labor and
self-produced inputsÞ, is about Rs 5,800/acre. As table C2 shows, there is
some variation in prices between villages but no signiﬁcant variation within
villages. For this reason, we think it is reasonable to omit prices from our set of
explanatory variables, as long as we are including village ﬁxed effects.
The results in table 5 indicate that WTP is largely driven by the probability
of the best outcome. Increasing the probability of the best outcome by 10%
increases WTP by, on average, Rs 153–57, while increasing the probability of
the worst outcome by the same magnitude decreases WTP by, on average,
Rs 32–37. That is, WTP is more sensitive to the probability of the highestThis content downloaded from 139.184.30.133 on Tue, 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 AM
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outcome than to the probability of the lowest outcome. As such, it is clear that
252 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Estandard static expected utility will not explain the variation in the data unless
farmers are risk loving.
Overall, the threemodels give very similar results. The yield of the last season
ð2007–8Þ does not have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on WTP in model 2.
However, as the regressions include a village-level ﬁxed effect, one cannot
conclude from this result that the reference point has no impact onWTP, as the
village-level ﬁxed effects might be absorbing the majority of this effect.
The Kinkhed ﬁxed effect is substantial in magnitude. The ﬁxed effects
represent between-village-level variation in climatic conditions, characteristics
of the agricultural system ðsuch as intercroppingÞ, the outside options avail-
able to the farmer if the “bet” is rejected, or reference point effects. As the
climate and agricultural conditions in Kanzara are similar to the ones in Kin-
khed, the positive sign on the Kinkhed dummy variable could imply that the
outside options for farmers in Kinkhed are less favorable compared to Kanzara
farmers. Education, which could potentially inﬂuence WTP by changing the
outside option of the farmer, does not appear to have any relation to WTP.
B. The Relationship between Risk-Loving Behavior and Household Assets
The violations of risk aversion in the data are striking in terms of what they
indicate about the prevalence of risk-taking behavior. Interviews with the
farmers before the data collection ðduring the pilot roundÞ indicated that they
were disproportionately attracted to the possibility of achieving the high pay-
off associated with 8 Q/acre. Some of the farmers explicitly justiﬁed their
choices by explaining that if the high outcome were achieved they would be
able to invest in large projects such as irrigation for their farm or higher edu-
cation for their children.
With this in mind, we now examine some of the correlates of risk-taking
behavior. We begin with some simple summary statistics. We segregate the re-
spondents into four groups in table 6: group 1 consists of respondents who
are risk averse in that they ðweaklyÞ prefer L1 to L2 and strictly prefer L4 to L3;
group 2 respondents are moderately risk seeking in that they strictly prefer L2
over L1 but strictly prefer L4 to L3; group 3 respondents are extremely risk seek-
ing in that they strictly prefer L2 over L1 and weakly prefer L3 to L4; group 4 is
an unusual group in that these respondents weakly prefer L1 to L2 but then
weakly prefer L3 to L4.
Table 6 shows that both wealth and income are negatively correlated with
risk-seeking behavior when we compare groups 1–3. Interestingly, group 4
respondents appear to be wealthier and have higher incomes than the other
groups, which makes us think that their stated preferences may not necessarilyThis content downloaded from 139.184.30.133 on Tue, 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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be “mistakes” ðalthough we have not found a satisfactory explanation for these
254 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G EpreferencesÞ. Turning back to groups 1 and 2, we ﬁnd that risk seeking is also
associated with more dryland as well as more children who are currently in
school ðalthough neither of these two associations appears statistically signiﬁ-
cant when we test the differences in means across groupsÞ, which appears to
ﬁt with the qualitative evidence. As we would expect, group 3 respondents
have a signiﬁcantly higher valuation for L2 relative to L1 ði.e., WTP2 2WTP1Þ
than do group 2 respondents.
We consider the difference in WTP between distributions 2 and 1 and the
difference in WTP between distributions 3 and 4 as two measures of will-
ingness to take risks.15 Thus, a positive difference indicates a risk-loving at-
titude, while a negative difference indicates risk aversion. Figure 1 presents
the distribution of these two variables. The mean of the ﬁrst distribution
ðWTP2 2WTP1Þ is Rs 85, and the standard deviation is Rs 128. The mean
of the second distribution ðWTP3 2WTP4Þ is Rs 24, and the standard de-
viation is Rs 166.
In ﬁgure 2A we plot the predicted values of ðWTP2 2WTP1Þ and ðWTP3
2WTP4Þ from a regression of these variables on the total value of assets ðsee
table C3 for the regression resultsÞ, where we have assumed a quadratic speci-
ﬁcation.We see that the predicted willingness to assume risk in order to achieve
high outcomes has a U-shaped relationship with wealth ðas table C3 shows,
these results are robust to controlling for the respondent’s educationÞ. Note
however in ﬁgure 2B and the results in table C3 that the increasing leg of the
U shape appears not to be strongly present in the raw data.
In tables 7 and 8, we investigate the relationship between asset composition
and the willingness to take on risk. Our basic speciﬁcation is as follows:
yi 5 a1 b0Collegei 1 b1Noncollegei
1 g0TotalLandi 1 g1FractionDryi 1 dX i 1 ei;
where y denotes a measure of risk seeking; College denotes the number of
college-age members of individual i ’s household; Noncollege denotes the num-
ber of non-college-age members; TotalLand denotes the total land ðin acresÞ
owned by the household; FractionDry denotes the fraction of this total land that
is not irrigated; X denotes a vector of controls including the individual’s edu-
cation ðin yearsÞ, the value of his nonland wealth, and village ﬁxed effects; and e
denotes an unobserved error term. In this speciﬁcation, our interest lies in the
coefﬁcients on College and FractionDry, which capture the potential for invest-
15 Using the language of Just and Lybbert ð2009Þ, these are measures of marginal risk aversion.This content downloaded from 139.184.30.133 on Tue, 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 AM
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Figure 1. A, Histogram of WTP22WTP1; B, histogram of WTP32WTP4 ðone observation of21,500was
dropped to keep a similar scale as in AÞ.
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ment in children’s college education and the potential for investment in irrigation.
Figure 2. A, Predicted differences in willingness to pay ðWTPÞ as a function of per capita wealth; B,
differences in WTP as a function of per capita wealth ðone observation of 21,500 in WTP3 2 WTP4 was
dropped to keep a similar scale as in ﬁg. 1AÞ. Wealth measure includes livestock, savings, borrowings
and lendings, machinery, equipment, other durable goods, stocks, and land.
256 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G EOn the basis of our qualitative interviews, we expect that these two variables
should strongly predict risk-seeking preferences.
Table 7 implements this speciﬁcation using our ﬁrst measure of risk seeking
based on a comparison between the individual’s WTP for lotteries 1 and 2. In
column 1, we present the average marginal effects from a probit regression in
which the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the in-This content downloaded from 139.184.30.133 on Tue, 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 AM
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dividual strictly prefers lottery 2 to lottery 1. In column 2, we present the co-
TABLE 7
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK LOVING AND HOUSEHOLD ASSETS: LOTTERIES 1 AND 2
Probit Linear Regression Probit Linear Regression
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
Number of college-age
members 2.065 12.312** .004 2.004 15.617*** .009**
ð.041Þ ð4.918Þ ð.005Þ ð.023Þ ð5.051Þ ð.004Þ
Number of non-college-age
members .005 .895 2.001 2.001 21.528 2.004
ð.025Þ ð4.553Þ ð.005Þ ð.014Þ ð4.885Þ ð.005Þ
Total land ðacresÞ 2.031** 21.161 2.003*** 2.026** 2.429 2.002**
ð.014Þ ð1.299Þ ð.001Þ ð.012Þ ð1.521Þ ð.001Þ
Fraction of land not irrigated .209** 28.771* .037** .381** 22.160 .028*
ð.096Þ ð16.219Þ ð.017Þ ð.176Þ ð17.639Þ ð.017Þ
Education of decision
maker ðyearsÞ .008 2.406 2.002 2.029* 21.415 2.002
ð.012Þ ð1.986Þ ð.002Þ ð.017Þ ð1.997Þ ð.002Þ
Wealth ðother assets;
1,000 RsÞ 2.000 2.039 2.000 2.000 2.036 2.000
ð.000Þ ð.028Þ ð.000Þ ð.000Þ ð.038Þ ð.000Þ
Aurepalle fixed effect 14.639 .056** 238.265* 2.023
ð18.744Þ ð.022Þ ð22.246Þ ð.024Þ
Kinkhed fixed effect .399*** 196.251*** .185*** .382* 148.747*** .112***
ð.088Þ ð28.701Þ ð.034Þ ð.216Þ ð31.918Þ ð.036Þ
Constant 56.136 2.016 52.826 2.037
ð36.122Þ ð.040Þ ð43.187Þ ð.047Þ
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses; college-age members are those between age 15 and 25.
Dependent variable in cols. 1 and 4 is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the individual preferred the
second lottery to the ﬁrst ðwith indifference being coded as a 0Þ, and 0 otherwise. Dependent variable in
cols. 2 and 5 is the difference between the individual’s willingness to pay for lotteries 2 and 1; dependent
variable in cols. 3 and 6 is the difference between the individual’s willingness to pay for lotteries 2 and 1
divided by his willingness to pay for lottery 1; coefﬁcients in cols. 1 and 4 denote average marginal effects.
Regressions in cols. 4–6 exclude any individuals who preferred lottery 1 over 2 but also preferred lottery 3
over 4.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
Maertens, Chari, and Just 257efﬁcients from a linear regression in which the dependent variable is the differ-
ence in WTP between lotteries 2 and 1 ðthus a positive difference denotes risk
seekingÞ. Because each individual may be evaluating the lotteries relative to a
unique reference point, this might affect the amount he is willing to pay. To ad-
just for this reference point effect, we present in column 3 the results from a
linear regression in which we scale the difference in WTP between L2 and L1
by the WTP for L1. We remarked earlier that there is a ðsmallÞ set of indi-
viduals who are risk averse in the comparison between L1 and L2 but turn out
to be risk seeking in the comparison between L3 and L4. We think it is possible
that our model may not apply to these individuals. Accordingly, columns 4–6This content downloaded from 139.184.30.133 on Tue, 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 AM
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redo the estimations dropping this set of individuals. Finally, table 8 repeats
TABLE 8
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK LOVING AND HOUSEHOLD ASSETS: LOTTERIES 3 AND 4
Probit Linear Regression Probit Linear Regression
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
Number of college-age
members .083** 10.215** .016*** .084* 9.653* .013**
ð.038Þ ð4.742Þ ð.005Þ ð.048Þ ð5.362Þ ð.005Þ
Number of non-college-age
members .015 22.394 .003 .015 22.237 .004
ð.020Þ ð4.301Þ ð.005Þ ð.023Þ ð5.258Þ ð.006Þ
Total land ðacresÞ .004 2.462 .000 2.000 2.842 2.001
ð.006Þ ð1.041Þ ð.001Þ ð.007Þ ð1.359Þ ð.001Þ
Fraction of land not irrigated 2.047 8.745 2.004 .001 5.753 2.008
ð.066Þ ð15.222Þ ð.016Þ ð.085Þ ð17.619Þ ð.018Þ
Education of decision
maker ðyearsÞ .001 .548 .001 .009 .907 .002
ð.009Þ ð1.633Þ ð.002Þ ð.013Þ ð1.889Þ ð.002Þ
Wealth ðother assets;
1,000 RsÞ 2.000 2.024 2.000 2.000 2.035 2.000
ð.000Þ ð.031Þ ð.000Þ ð.000Þ ð.037Þ ð.000Þ
Aurepalle fixed effect 2131.818*** 2.195*** 2118.960*** 2.163***
ð15.618Þ ð.018Þ ð24.075Þ ð.026Þ
Kinkhed fixed effect .169** 76.184*** .016 .232*** 85.365*** .042
ð.071Þ ð22.881Þ ð.020Þ ð.079Þ ð29.799Þ ð.028Þ
Constant 56.136 2.016 52.826 2.037
ð36.122Þ ð.040Þ ð43.187Þ ð.047Þ
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses; college-age members are those between age 15 and 25.
Dependent variable in cols. 1 and 4 is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the individual preferred the third
lottery to the fourth ðwith indifference being coded as a 0Þ, and 0 otherwise. Dependent variable in cols. 2
and 5 is the difference between the individual’s willingness to pay for lotteries 3 and 4; dependent variable
in cols. 3 and 6 is the difference between the individual’s willingness to pay for lotteries 3 and 4 divided by
his willingness to pay for lottery 3; coefﬁcients in cols. 1 and 4 denote averagemarginal effects. Regressions
in cols. 4–6 exclude any individuals who preferred lottery 1 over 2 but also preferred lottery 3 over 4.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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comparison between lotteries L3 and L4.
We begin by discussing the results in table 7. Although not a signiﬁcant
predictor in the probit regression, the number of college-age members is sig-
niﬁcantly correlated with the difference in WTP between L2 and L1. In par-
ticular, having an extra college-age individual in the household increases the
difference in WTP by Rs 12–15. In contrast, the effect of the number of non-
college-age members on the probability of risk seeking and the difference in
WTP is neither economically nor statistically signiﬁcant. In all the speciﬁca-
tions, the fraction of dryland is a signiﬁcant correlate of risk seeking. A 10%
increase in the fraction of dryland increases the probability of risk seekingThis content downloaded from 139.184.30.133 on Tue, 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 AM
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by 2%–4% and increases the difference in WTP by about Rs 2. As expected,
Maertens, Chari, and Just 259the total landholding, being a measure of household wealth, is ðsigniﬁcantlyÞ
negatively correlated with risk seeking in these regressions. The household’s
nonland wealth appears to be negatively related to risk seeking ðas per the point
estimatesÞ, but the effect is not statistically signiﬁcant. Also notable is that the
education level of the individual does not signiﬁcantly predict either his pro-
pensity for or degree of risk seeking.
Turning to the results in table 8, we ﬁnd that the number of college-age
members continues to be signiﬁcantly correlated with risk seeking in the com-
parison between L3 and L4. Having an extra college-age individual in the house-
hold increases the probability of risk seeking by about 8% and increases the
WTP between the lotteries by about Rs 10. However, differently from the re-
sults in table 7, the fraction of dryland is no longer signiﬁcantly related to risk
seeking in either economic or statistical terms. These results appear to indicate
that the greater risk incurred by choosing L3 over L4 is not justiﬁed by the
returns to irrigation but may be justiﬁed by the returns to higher education.
This is not implausible: as we noted in Section II.A, the cost of digging a well
ða common source of water for irrigationÞ is high, and because the success of
the well is not guaranteed, irrigation may constitute a riskier investment than
education. ðThis is leaving aside the fact that, in part, irrigation is intended as
an insurance against low rainfall.Þ Indeed, our conversations with farmers on
the ﬁeld revealed that they were quite worried about the potential for wells to
fail. The exact location ðin terms of accessibilityÞ of groundwater was not
known to any farmer, and as a result, it was reported that wells frequently failed
to reach the groundwater table, and multiple attempts had to be made. In fact,
a common practice in these villages appeared to be to engage a local water
diviner whose job was to predict the correct spot in which to dig a well.
A reasonable hypothesis is that the prospect for undertaking investments in
irrigation ðas an underlying motivation for risk takingÞ may be more attrac-
tive, the greater the perceived availability of groundwater. The 2001–2 ICRISAT
survey asked farmers whether they had attempted to dig a well in the last 15 years
and whether the well was successful. It is therefore possible, at least in princi-
ple, to use an individual’s prior success as a measure of his own perception
of the availability of ground water. However, this prior success rate is only de-
ﬁned for farmers who had attempted to dig a well, and there are very few
such individuals in the 2001 data. Instead, we use the 2001 data to construct
village-level estimates of the success rate of attempted wells and interact these
village-level measures with the explanatory variable of interest, namely, the frac-
tion of the farmer’s land that is dry. Speciﬁcally, we include in our regression
interactions between the fraction of dryland and ðiÞ the number of attemptedThis content downloaded from 139.184.30.133 on Tue, 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 AM
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tween dryland and the prior success rate would be positive, indicating that farm-
ers who are more optimistic about the groundwater availability may be more
willing to take risks in order to be able to afford a well. The results, reported in
tables C4 and C5, are however quite imprecise, owing to the limitations of these
measures of groundwater availability. Although the coefﬁcient on the interac-
tion is indeed positive and marginally signiﬁcant in some regressions, it is neg-
ative and insigniﬁcant in others.
Overall, the results in tables 7 and 8 are consistent with the notion that the
prospect of being able to undertake large investments with potentially high
returns can be a justiﬁcation for risk seeking. We now present a simple for-
malization of this idea.
IV. A Simple Model of Risk-Loving Behavior
We outline here a simple illustrative model to capture the idea that non-
convexities can induce risk taking. Imagine a credit-constrained farmer who
lives for two periods and is risk neutral ði.e., his Bernoulli utility function is a
linear function of wealthÞ and that in each period he can choose between a
risky technology and a safe technology.16 In appendix B, we show that the es-
sential logic extends to the case in which the farmer is strictly risk averse.
If we assume that the two technologies give the same expected proﬁt, the
farmer will be indifferent between the two in both periods.However, the farmer
can also invest in an asset that increases proﬁts in the second period ðe.g., this
could represent an irrigation projectÞ. The farmer may then opt for the risky
technology in the ﬁrst period if the safe technology does not generate enough
proﬁt to cover the ﬁxed cost needed for the irrigation project.
It is clear that the potential returns to this investment will depend on the
asset position of the farmer. For instance, a farmer who owns more dryland
will—under certain conditions—beneﬁt more from installing an irrigation
system, compared to a farmer who owns less dryland. Similarly, a farmer who
has school-going children of an age at which they might beneﬁt from an in-
vestment in higher education might beneﬁt more compared to a farmer who
does not have school-going children of that age group.
We purposely abstract from several aspects of the agricultural decision-
making process, such as pesticide, fertilizer, and other variable-input decisions.
In addition, we assume that the farmer is credit constrained ðhe has no access
16 This model is inspired by the work of Carter andMay ð1999, 2001Þ, Barrett and Carter ð2001–2Þ,
Lybbert and Barrett ð2011Þ, and Lybbert et al. ðforthcomingÞ.
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to creditÞ, has a ﬁxed amount of land L > 0, and during the ﬁrst period has no
Maertens, Chari, and Just 261savings or irrigation system. For simplicity, we will assume that no storage is
possible, so that the only way to transfer consumption from the ﬁrst period to
the second is to invest in the asset. It is important to note that while we dis-
cuss the decision to invest in a new irrigation system, a similar model could ap-
ply to any type of large ﬁxed-cost investment that allows the farmer to move to
a superior production function.
Assume that in each time period t ∈ 1; 2f g, the farmer can choose between
two technologies: a “safe” technology that always yields f ðL;RÞ, where R in-
dicates whether the land is irrigated ðR ∈ 0; 1f gÞ, and a “risky” technology
that yields f ðL;RÞ1 ε with probability 1/2 and f ðL;RÞ2 ε with probability
1/2, with ε denoting the random component of the production function.
Assume that f ðL; 1Þ > f ðL; 0Þ ði.e., irrigation increases average land produc-
tivityÞ and that f ðL;RÞ2 ε > 0; that is, subsistence ðdeﬁned as zero con-
sumptionÞ is guaranteed even if one obtains the low yield. For simplicity, we
assume that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale ði.e.,
f ðL; Þ5 Lf ð1; ÞÞ and that no land results in no production ði.e., f ð0; Þ5 0Þ.
The former assumption implies that we can readily extend the model to the
experimental setup, as we elicited WTP for a bag of seeds for 1 acre of land.17
The per period Bernoulli utility function is given as uðcÞ, where c denotes
consumption. The utility function is assumed to be linear ði.e., uðcÞ5 cÞ. We
assume that a farmer cannot opt for negative consumption. Acquiring an
irrigation system requires a lump sum ﬁxed investment r > 0. We assume that
the cost of an irrigation system is substantial but feasible, and in particular that
f ðL; 0Þ1 ε > r > f ðL; 0Þ: ð5Þ
At the start of the ﬁrst period, the farmer choose between the safe and the risky
technologies. After the uncertainty is revealed and the proceeds are obtained,
the farmer decides whether to invest in the irrigation technology and, ﬁnally,
consumes. At the start of the second period, the farmer again makes a decision17 Note that if one assumes increasing, ormore commonly decreasing, returns to scale, theWTPdepends
on the amount of land one has. It is not obvious whether the elicited WTP would in that case
refer to the averageWTPor the marginal WTP ðof, e.g., the ﬁrst acre of landÞ. Intuitively, an increasing-
returns-to-scale production function does not change the results of the model as the potential returns
to the investment can be magniﬁed production functions. However, additional assumptions need to be
imposed for the results to continue to hold for a decreasing-returns-to-scale production function. For a
discussion on returns to scale in similar contexts, see Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder ð1995Þ and Ray
ð1998Þ.
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between the safe and the risky technology, after which the uncertainty is re-
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Let us approach this two-period problem using backward induction, start-
ing from the second period. From the setup, it is clear that in the second period
the farmer will be indifferent between the risky and the safe technologies.
Now note that if the farmer chooses the safe technology in the ﬁrst period,
following ð5Þ he will be unable to invest in an irrigation system. However, if
the farmer chooses the risky technology in the ﬁrst period and obtains the
high yield, he has the option to invest in an irrigation system. In that case, he
will compare the outcome with irrigation to the outcome without irrigation:
without irrigation: f ðL; 0Þ1 ε½ 1 d f ðL; 0Þ;
with irrigation: f ðL; 0Þ1 ε2 r½ 1 d f ðL; 1Þ;
where d ∈ 0; 1ð Þ is the discount factor, summarizing preferences over time.
The farmer opts for the irrigation system if and only if
d f ðL; 1Þ2 f ðL; 0Þ½  > r: ð7Þ
Under conditions ð5Þ and ð7Þ,18 the difference in WTP between the risky
and the safe technology is
WTPrisky 2WTPsafe 5
1
2
f ðL; 0Þ2 ε1 df ðL; 0Þ½ 
1
1
2
f ðL; 0Þ1 ε2 r 1 df ðL; 1Þ½ 2 f ðL; 0Þ1 d f ðL; 0Þ½ :
Rewriting ð8Þ:
WTPrisky 2WTPsafe 5
1
2
df ðL; 1Þ2 df ðL; 0Þ2 r½ : ð9Þ
Following ð7Þ, ðWTPrisky 2WTPsafeÞ is strictly positive. Note now that
whether ð5Þ and ð7Þ are satisﬁed depends ðamong other factorsÞ on L. As-
suming that these conditions continue to hold, one could take the derivative
ð9Þ with respect to land, obtaining
ð6Þ
ð8Þ
18 Equations ð5Þ and ð7Þ imply that the returns to investment are very large compared to the base
return. This condition might be difﬁcult to meet in a two-period model but could be easily met if one
imagines the increased return to be sustained over a longer period of time.
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1
d
y f ðL; 1Þ
2
y f ðL; 0Þ 
: ð10Þ
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Assuming constant returns to scale, expression ð10Þ is strictly positive. Thus,
the difference in WTP increases as one has more dryland. Moreover, this
increase in WTP is increasing in the returns to irrigation.
V. Concluding Discussion
In this article we have analyzed the relationship between attitudes toward risk
and investment possibilities. We are able to take advantage of a unique data set
that we collected among farmers in India’s semiarid tropics, which contains
information on farmers’ assets and the results from a risk experiment. This risk
experiment consisted of four hypothetical farming seasons. For each season,
the farmer was asked how much he would be willing to pay for a bag of cot-
ton seed resulting in a particular yield distribution.
Comparing the WTP for the various yield distributions, we ﬁnd a high
incidence of risk-seeking behavior. Further, we ﬁnd a robust relationship be-
tween risk-loving behavior and wealth and assets ðwhich remains even after
controlling for the respondent’s educationÞ. In particular, the potential for in-
vestment in irrigation and children’s college education appear to be strongly cor-
related with risk-seeking behavior.
The setup of our experiment is distinct from previous studies in a number
of signiﬁcant ways. In particular, our experiments ðiÞ involved hypothetical
payoffs, ðiiÞ were explicitly framed in an agricultural context, and ðiiiÞ in-
volved high stakes. Regarding i, while it is possible that subjects respond dif-
ferently to hypothetical versus real gambles, the evidence from the experimen-
tal literature is mixed. Differently from laboratory experiments, we explicitly
framed our lotteries in terms of yield from an agricultural crop ðcottonÞ. This
served to add realism to the experiment, which partly compensated for the
hypothetical nature of the payoffs. Providing a familiar context made it easy
for the farmers to understand the gambles and what they represented.
Finally, whereas prior studies have typically presented respondents with
small- and medium-stakes gambles, our experiments involved fairly large pay-
offs on the order of an individual’s annual income.We think, on the basis of our
qualitative interviews as well as our analysis of the data, that this factor may ac-
count for our ﬁnding of risk-loving preferences. We also think that our results,
while different, are not necessarily incompatible with the ﬁndings of prior
studies. The logic that high-ﬁxed-cost investments with high returns can justify
risk loving in the face of high-payoff gambles would also imply that if the pay-This content downloaded from 139.184.30.133 on Tue, 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 AM
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The idea of the “gambling poor” is certainly not novel—Friedman and Sav-
age ð1948Þ argue that the curvature of the utility function of the “poor” is dif-
ferent from the rich, resulting in risk-taking behavior. Banerjee and Newman
ð1994Þ argue that poverty traps might result in “risk-loving poor” but that
credit constraints might restrict their set of options. Empirically, the “gambling
poor” have been noted in other contexts. Mo ð2011Þ ﬁnds that perceived rela-
tive poverty induces more risk-seeking behavior with regard to migration and
economic opportunities in Nepal. Clotfelter ð1979Þ, Borg and Mason ð1988Þ,
and Hansen, Miyazaki, and Sprott ð2000Þ ﬁnd that the poor in the United
States spend a greater percentage of their income on lotteries and gambling than
others.
Binswanger’s ð1980Þ study of risk preferences in the same ICRISAT villages
provides an interesting point of comparison with our study. Binswanger’s
experiments were done with three stake levels: low, medium, and high. His
high stakes are comparable to our stakes ðon the order of annual incomeÞ and
were also hypothetical, whereas the low- and medium-stakes experiments in-
volved real payoffs. He found high levels of risk aversion: for the hypothetical
stakes, he ﬁnds that 14% are severely risk averse, 52% intermediately, and 28%
moderately, compared with the medium real stakes where he ﬁnds that 5% are
severely risk averse, 35% intermediately, 40% moderately, and 5% are neutral
ðthe intermediate range is classiﬁed as a Partial Relative Risk Aversion between
1.74 and 0.812Þ.
The fact that Binswanger’s respondents were risk averse even when con-
fronted with hypothetical payoffs is in a sense comforting. But this makes our
results even more striking, given that we explicitly provided a realistic context
for our gambles, and we are therefore even more conﬁdent that our respon-
dents understood the game ðand were thus even less likely to mistakenly prefer
risky distributions to safe onesÞ.
We offer two speculative hypotheses to explain the differences between our
results and Binswanger’s. First, while credit markets in developing countries
have always been incomplete, a number of factors such as climate change, the
availability of genetically modiﬁed seeds, and new agricultural output and la-
bor market opportunities have changed the cost-beneﬁt calculations of invest-
ments in irrigation and education in India in the last few decades. In particular,
technological improvements have lowered the cost of groundwater irrigation in
India and led to a boom in borewell construction. According to statistics from
the Indian Water Management Institute, the number of wells in India has in-This content downloaded from 139.184.30.133 on Tue, 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 AM
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creased from about 1million in 1960 to nearly 19million in 2000. Shah ð2005Þ
Maertens, Chari, and Just 265shows that while groundwater extraction has been growing in many countries,
India is an extreme outlier, with more than 200 cubic kilometers of water ex-
tracted in 2000 ðcompared to, e.g., about 75 cubic kilometers in the case of
ChinaÞ. At the same time, the cost of borewell construction is not insigniﬁcant,
and fragmented landholdings mean that many plots of land lie unirrigated
ðShah 1993Þ.
Second, our gambles were presented as yield distributions corresponding to
a cash crop, cotton. There is evidence from other settings that risk preferences
may be sensitive to the context ðWolf and Pohlman 1983; Barseghyan, Prince,
and Teitlebaum 2011; Einav et al. 2012Þ. Thus, we think it is possible that
farmers are more ready to take risks in the context of cash crops but are more
likely to be risk averse when it comes to food crops. This may constitute an
interesting avenue for future research.
To conclude, we investigate risk-seeking behavior among cotton farmers in
India and ﬁnd that nonconvexities associated with certain investments might
play an important role. The presence of these nonconvexities has implications
for the design of a poverty alleviation program, as the impact of credit or cash
transfers programs can be expected to depend, in a nonlinear manner, on the
household’s asset status ðsee also Barrett and Carter ½2013 on the implications
of poverty traps for policyÞ.
Appendix A
The experiment was conducted among all households who have made farming
decisions in the past 7 years or intend to make farming decisions in the future.
The reason for this selection is the experiment’s context-speciﬁc nature, which
would make little sense to nonagricultural households ðas we found out dur-
ing the trial roundÞ. To obtain responses based on recent experiences, we decided
to interview only the households who farmed within the past 7 years, since in
that time frame many new technologies were introduced, such as genetically
modiﬁed cotton seeds. The households that did not satisfy these criteria did not
participate in the experiment.
The experiment took place at the end of a 3–5 hour interview, interrupted
with a few tea breaks. The respondent, who was the main decision maker with
regard to agriculture, received about US$1.5 for participating in the interview,
the equivalent of about 1 day’s labor. In addition, the respondents in each vil-
lage were invited every 2–3 years to participate in a day trip funded by this
study together with other studies. The interview took place in the respondent’s
residence. No active effort was undertaken to separate the respondent fromThis content downloaded from 139.184.30.133 on Tue, 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 AM
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other family members, but as the interview took several hours, only in a few
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subjective questions ðsuch as in this experimentÞ, the respondent was not al-
lowed to discuss the answers with his family members.
The respondent was given ample time to learn the game. As the game was
preceded by another game involving visual representations of a distribution
function, the respondents were comfortable with the Fisher-Price blocks of
various colors. The instructions for the enumerators are given below. The ﬁrst
author taught the enumerators this game, both in a lab setting and subse-
quently in a ﬁeld setting, so we are conﬁdent that all enumerators understood
the game and conducted it in the samemanner. For each distribution, the farmer
was asked to imagine going to the store and buying seeds for this season.
Instructions for the Enumerators
The goal of this part of the questionnaire is to get an idea of the risk aversion
of the respondents. This question is asked of all households who have made
farming decisions in the past 7 years and/or intend tomake farming decisions in
the future. We will use Fisher Price building blocks to represent yield distri-
butions of cotton, and ask the respondent how much they would be willing to
pay for a bag of these seeds ðsufﬁcient for 1 acre of landÞ. Tell the respondent
that we will play another game with him/her. You say: “Just like on your own
farm, you will have the chance to buy seeds at the beginning of each season, but
not know the yield until the end of the season. On your own farm, how much
you earn depends on whether it is a good year or a bad year. In this game it is
the same. In a good year, you will harvest more, in a bad year you will harvest
less.”
Then, place the building blocks on the white board. One block represents
5%, requiring a total of 20 blocks for the game.
• The green blocks 5 high yield ð8 quintal/acreÞ good season
• The yellow blocks 5 average yield ð6 quintal/acreÞ average season
• The red blocks 5 low yield ð4 quintal/acreÞ bad season
Explain to the respondent the meaning of the different blocks. Do several ex-
ercises holding up one block, two blocks etc. to check whether he can associate
the percentages with the blocks. Once the respondent understands the mean-
ing of the blocks, make 2 trial distributions to learn the game. Then proceed
with the 4 distributions given in the questionnaire. For each distribution ask
how much the respondent is willing to pay at most, starting from 100 Rs and
working your way up in steps of 50 Rs until the farmer changes his answer.This content downloaded from 139.184.30.133 on Tue, 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 AM
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Then, decrease the amount to identify the exact point ðto thenearest 5RsÞ. After
Maertens, Chari, and Just 267the respondent has answered, verify and write down the answers ðin RsÞ in the
boxes.
• Trial experiment 1 ½100% in low yield
• Trial experiment 2 ½50% in low yield and 50% in average yield
• Experiment 1 ½25% in low yield, 50% in average yield and 25% in high
yield
• Experiment 2 ½30% in low yield, 40% in average yield and 30% in high
yield
• Experiment 3 ½30% in low yield, 30% in average yield and 40% in high
yield
• Experiment 4 ½10% in low yield, 55% in average yield and 35% in high
yield
Appendix B
00We now lay out the farmer’s decision problem when u ðcÞ < 0. As before, let
us approach this two-period problem using backward induction, starting from
the second period. In the second period, after the farmer has made his irri-
gation investment decision, he compares the expected utility of the safe and
risky technologies. As his Bernoulli utility function is ðstrictlyÞ concave, he opts
for the safe technology. Again, if the farmer chooses the safe technology in the
ﬁrst period, following ð5Þ, he is unable to invest in an irrigation system. How-
ever, if he chooses the risky technology in the ﬁrst period and obtains the high
yield, he has the option to invest in an irrigation system. In that case, he will
compare the outcomes with and without irrigation:
without irrigation: u f ðL; 0Þ1 ε½ 1 duf ðL; 0Þ;
with irrigation: u f ðL; 0Þ1 ε2 r½ 1 duf ðL; 1Þ;
where d ∈ 0; 1ð Þ is the discount factor, summarizing preferences over time. In
this case, the farmer opts for the irrigation system if and only if
u f ðL; 0Þ1 ε2 r½ 1 du f ðL; 1Þ½  > u f ðL; 0Þ1 ε½ 1 du f ðL; 0Þ½ : ðB2Þ
Under conditions ð5Þ and ðB2Þ, the difference in WTP between the risky and
the safe technology in the ﬁrst period is19
ðB1Þ
19 Note here that we simpliﬁed the farmer’s decision-making problem by equating the WTP to the
discounted expected value, thereby ignoring the initial wealth. This simpliﬁcation does not change
the main result.
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WTPrisky 2WTPsafe 5
1
u f ðL; 0Þ2 ε½ 1 du f ðL; 0Þ½ ½ 
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1the
B3Þ1
2
u f ðL; 0Þ1 ε2 r½ 1 du f ðL; 1Þ½ ½ 
2 u f ðL; 0Þ½ 1 du f ðL; 0Þ½ ½ :
The sign of ðB3Þ is ambiguous and depends on further assumptions on
returns to the investment. However, assuming constant returns to scale,
ðthe
derivative of ðB3Þ with respect to land is strictly positive.Appendix CTABLE C1CORRELATES OF INDIVID
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distributions is not statistically signiﬁcant.
*** p < .01.: ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSIONOutput Price ðRs/QuintalÞ Input Cost ðRs/AcreÞ
Number of members 211.3 216.8ð17.3Þ
20.3 29 Jul 2014 04:28:35 A
onditionsð155.8Þ
2230.3Number of adult membersð22.3Þ ð199.8Þ
Dryland ðacresÞ 2.7 25.7ð5.1Þ ð45Þ
Irrigated land ðacresÞ 3.4 40.6ð5.2Þ ð40.9Þ
Access to a plot of good soil quality 50.8 1,044.9ð81.2Þ ð712.5Þ
Number of plots of good soil quality > 1 acre 14 224.1ð20.6Þ ð182.7Þ
Education level of decision maker ðyearsÞ 9.6 22.7ð5.9Þ ð53.7ÞM
TABLE C2 (Continued)
Output Price ðRs/QuintalÞ Input Cost ðRs/AcreÞ
Aurepalle fixed effect 2211.2*** 3,763.8***TAB
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK LOVING AND W
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Kinkhed fixed effect 239.8
ð58.2Þ
2799.3
ð508.2ÞConstant 2,037.1*** 3,133.6***
ð95.1Þ ð836.7ÞNote. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < .01.REGRESSIONWTP2 2 WTP1
ð1Þ
WTP3 2 WTP4
ð2Þ
WTP2 2 WTP1
ð3Þ
WTP3 2 WTP4
ð4ÞPer capita wealth ð10,000 RsÞ 22.83***
ð.65Þ23.53***
ð.64Þ22.78***
ð.66Þa
n
1 AND
M23.25***
ð.62ÞPer capita wealth2 .02*** .02*** .02*** .02***
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00ÞEducation level of decision
maker ðyearsÞ 1.53 7.75***Constant 124.05*** 54.52*** 116.20*** 14.74Note. Standard errors in parenð12.46Þ ð12.26Þ ð16.13Þ
s willingness to pð15.27Þ
y ðWTPÞ for thesecond ðthirdÞ distribution min
eses; N 5 203.
the WTP for thependent variabl
rst ðfourthÞ distri tion in the ﬁrst a d third ðseconddes livestock, lan , savings, borrow s and lendings, chinery, equip-and fourthÞ columns. Wealth inclu d ing ma
ment, other durable goods, and stocks.
*** p < .01.
TABLE C4
2ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
Number of college-age
members .026**
ð.012Þ
10.685**
ð4.874Þ.015***
ð.005Þ.021*
ð.012Þ10.226*
ð5.493Þ.013**
ð.005ÞNumber of non-college-
age members .003 22.004 .002 .012 21.226 .005ð.014Þ ð4.374Þ ð.005Þ ð.018Þ ð5.608Þ ð.006Þ
Total land ðacresÞ .058
ð.054Þ
9.651
ð17.208Þ
.020
ð.018Þ2.065
ð.325Þ237.259
ð81.337Þ2.014
ð.088ÞFraction of land not irrigated 23.358** 2315.556 2.627* 23.902* 2323.422 2.861
ð1.348Þ ð336.724Þ ð.375Þ ð2.296Þ ð567.459Þ ð.592ÞFraction of land not irrigated
 success rate of wells 6.743** 703.349 1.300* 7.796* 715.385 1.744ð2.629Þ ð683.242Þ ð.741Þ ð4.408Þ ð1,104.483Þ ð1.141Þ
Fraction of land not irrigated
 number of well attempts 2.021*** 22.648 2.004* 2.024* 22.683 2.006*
ð.008Þ ð2.236Þ ð.002Þ ð.013Þ ð3.300Þ ð.003Þ269
TABLE C4 (Continued)
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
Education of decision
maker ðyearsÞ 2ð
This conten.001
ð.005Þ
ð.015Þ
2.809Þ ð
ð.008Þ
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ð1.730Þ
ð5.139Þ
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ð2.475Þ
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ð.002Þ
ð.005Þ
ð.881Þ
ð.003Þ
33 on Tue, 29
rms and Con2.000
ð.006Þ
ð.008Þ
ð2.018Þ
ð.006Þ
 Jul 2014 04:28
ditions.955
ð2.041Þ
f
ð5.207Þ
ð977.215Þ
ð3.012Þ
:35 AM.002
ð.002ÞWealth ðother assets;
1,000 RsÞ 2.000 2.031 2.000 2.000 2.035 2.000ð.000Þ ð.030Þ ð.000Þ ð.000Þ ð.030Þ ð.000Þ
Aurepalle fixed effect 2.869***
ð.054Þ
2122.252***
ð18.384Þ
2.199***
ð.023Þ2.810***
ð.114Þ2129.558***
ð36.068Þ2.194***
ð.041ÞKinkhed fixed effect 2.024 53.579 2.012 .016 44.086 2.012
ð.094Þ ð36.200Þ ð.034Þ ð.144Þ ð48.920Þ ð.049ÞConstant .818*** 60.878* .004 .763*** 71.489 .002
ð.095Þ ð33.891Þ ð.042Þ ð.139Þ ð46.115Þ ð.054Þrs in parentheses; college-age members are those between age 15 and 25.Note. Robust standard erro
Dependent variable in cols. 1 and 4 is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the individual pre erred theh indifference being coded as a 0Þ, and 0 otherwise; coefﬁcients in cols. 1 andsecond lottery to the ﬁrst ðwit
4 are from linear regressions ðthe corresponding probit regressions could not be estimated with the
inclusion of the interaction variablesÞ. Dependent variable in cols. 2 and 5 is the difference between the
individual’s willingness to pay for lotteries 2 and 1; dependent variable in cols. 3 and 6 is the difference
between the individual’s willingness to pay for lotteries 2 and 1 divided by his willingness to pay for lottery
1. Regressions in cols. 4–6 exclude any individuals who preferred lottery 1 over 2 but also preferred lottery
3 over 4. “Number of well attempts” and “success rate of wells” are village-speciﬁc averages computed
from 2001 ICRISAT survey data.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
TABLE C5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK LOVING AND HOUSEHOLD ASSETS: LOTTERIES 3 AND 4
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
Number of college-age
members 2.025 13.364** .005 .000 16.782*** .010**ð.005Þ
Number of non-college-
age members .005 .751 2.002 2.003 21.686 2.006ð.014Þ ð4.481Þ ð.005Þ ð.008Þ ð5.442Þ ð.006Þ
Total land ðacresÞ 2.205***
ð.060Þ
222.540
ð18.417Þ2.043*
ð.022Þ2.308
ð.243Þ260.696
ð99.134Þ2.091
ð.105ÞFraction of land not
irrigated 2.295 348.537 .645 1.496 497.991 .812ð1.460Þ ð382.039Þ ð.451Þ ð1.047Þ ð494.237Þ ð.536Þ
Fraction of land not
irrigated  success
rate of wells 24.246 2554.451 21.153 22.759 2845.574 21.476ð1.040Þ
Fraction of land not
irrigated  number
of well attempts .011 .854 .003 .007 1.706 .004ð.003Þ
Education of decision
maker ðyearsÞ .002 .212 2.001 2.004 2.658 2.00127
TABLE C5 (Continued)
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
Maertens, Chari, and Just 271ð.006Þ ð2.031Þ ð.002Þ ð.003Þ ð1.982Þ ð.002Þ
Wealth ðother assets;r
s
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ditions8:35 AM1,000 RsÞ 2.000*
ð.000Þ2.042
ð.027Þ2.000
ð.000Þ2.000
ð.000Þ2.042
ð.030Þ2.000
ð.000ÞAurepalle fixed effect .476***
ð.097Þ36.259
ð27.359Þ.067**
ð.032Þ.043
ð.087Þ220.124
ð46.184Þ2.015
ð.055ÞKinkhed fixed effect .411*** 185.147*** .187*** .018 134.522** .111
ð.100Þ ð39.717Þ ð.044Þ ð.105Þ ð58.165Þ ð.067ÞConstant .607*** 30.190 .090* .990*** 85.985* .164***
ð.095Þ ð33.891Þ ð.042Þ ð.139Þ ð46.115Þ ð.054Þrors in parentheses; colleg -age members are those between age 15 and 25.Note. Robust standard e
Dependent variable in col . 1 and 4 is an indicator that takes the va ue 1 if the in ividual preferred the thirddifference being coded as a 0Þ, and 0 otherwise; coefﬁcients in cols. 1 and 4 arelottery to the fourth ðwith in
from linear regressions ðthe corresponding probit regressions could not be estimated with the inclusion of
the interaction variablesÞ. Dependent variable in cols. 2 and 5 is the difference between the individual’s
willingness to pay for lotteries 3 and 4; dependent variable in cols. 3 and 6 is the difference between the
individual’s willingness to pay for lotteries 3 and 4 divided by his willingness to pay for lottery 3. Regres-
sions in cols. 4–6 exclude any individuals who preferred lottery 1 over 2 but also preferred lottery 3 over 4.
“Number of well attempts” and “success rate of wells” are village-speciﬁc averages computed from 2001
ICRISAT survey data.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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